15 November 1997

Posted on November 15, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

In a speech in Sacramento, California, President Bill Clinton portrays a bleak future if nations do not cooperate against “organized forces of destruction,” telling the audience that only a small amount of “nuclear cake put in a bomb would do ten times as much damage as the Oklahoma City bomb did.” Stopping the spread of nuclear materials and not letting weapons “fall into the wrong hands” is “fundamentally what is stake in the stand-off we’re having in Iraq today,” he says.

Clinton asked Americans not to view the current crisis as a “replay” of the Gulf War in 1991. Instead, “think about it in terms of the innocent Japanese people that died in the subway when the sarin gas was released [by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo in 1995]; and how important it is for every responsible government in the world to do everything that can possibly be done not to let big stores of chemical or biological weapons fall into the wrong hands, not to let irresponsible people develop the capacity to put them in warheads on missiles or put them in briefcases that could be exploded in small rooms. And I say this not to frighten you.”

It is a good reminder that the WMD phantom—with Iraq, North Korea, Iran, etc.—is perpetual and also, short of destroying Iraq and war, we are so unable to peacefully resolve the bigger question of proliferation in the most difficult cases.

14 November 1998

Posted on November 14, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Saddam Hussein revokes his August 5 decision to cease cooperation with the United Nations inspectors (UNSCOM). Iraq states in a letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan that it is willing to resume inspections. But the U.S. and U.K. argue that the country imposes a number of unacceptable conditions with its offer, particularly restrictions on visiting presidential sites and including American inspectors. Capitulating, Iraq then informs the U.N. Security Council that it was the “clear and unconditional decision of the Iraqi government to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.”

As Iraq deliberates on resumption of inspections, an air and cruise missile operation (Desert Viper) is being prepared and even implemented: aircraft moving into place, armed, with targets selected. When Iraq notifies the Security Council, President Clinton aborts Desert Viper just minutes before the designated H-hour (11:00 AM EST).

In a televised address, President Clinton later says that Iraq has “backed down” and pledged full cooperation with UNSCOM. The president also makes clear that U.S. policy includes the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as a prerequisite for resumption of normal relations. The UNSC accepts Iraq’s decision and issues a statement in which it stresses that Iraq’s commitment “needs to be established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities provided for in their mandates.”

The U.S. and U.K. then threaten that without full cooperation, they will strike Iraq without warning. According to the Iraq Survey Group, the events of 1998 “had so poisoned the atmosphere with UNSCOM that the relationship could not be repaired.” It was the end of inspections and the beginning of the road to certain war, but also not the last time that a president stopped an underway bombing operation, President Trump doing so vis-à-vis Iran.

13 November 1995

Posted on November 13, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

The Office of Personnel Management/Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG) in downtown Riyadh is bombed.

In probably the first al Qaeda attack against the United States, an obscure U.S. military outpost, the Office of Personnel Management/Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG) in downtown Riyadh is attacked, killing six Americans and two East Indian contractors. The 300 lb. bomb was detonated outside the small building housing U.S. military and contractor personnel overseeing the massive U.S. military assistance program.

“Despite demands from Washington that U.S. officials be kept informed, the Saudis quickly shut the door on its investigation.” (Age of Sacred Terror, p. 132). Something called the Islamic Movement of Change took responsibility, an organization thought to be connected to (or inspired by) Osama bin Laden.

“In this case especially, the Saudis, who are secretive by nature, didn’t want foreign police agencies poking into their internal affairs. Indeed their Minister of the Interior compiled a list of several hundred suspects culled from nearly 15,000 files of Saudi nationals who’d fought in or supported the Afghan War.” (The Cell, pp. 149–150).

Four suspects were eventually and officially apprehended, though FBI investigators are denied direct access to them, with those suspects then secretly tried and publicly executed. In the words of Lawrence Wright, “The men read their nearly identical confessions on Saudi television, admitting that they had been influenced by reading bin Laden’s speeches and those of other prominent dissidents. They then were taken to a public square and beheaded.” (Looming Tower, p. 211)

The following people were killed in the terrorist attack on OPM-SANG’s headquarters: Sgt. 1st Class David K. Warrell, James H. Allen, Alaric J. Brozovsky, William L. Combs, Jr., Tracy V. Henley, Wayne P. Wiley, Eyakunnath Balakrishnan, and Thermal B. Devadas. Both Balakrishnan and Devadas were cooks in the building’s cafeteria.

12 November 1994

Posted on November 12, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Wandering around the globe, oblivious to everything terrorism and Islam going on around him, Bill Clinton lands in the Philippines on a two-day state visit, visiting Corregidor, site of the Japanese victory in the conquest of the American commonwealth in World War II, and of the U.S. Army’s return.

While in the Philippines, what are now believed to be al Qaeda operatives (including Ramzi Yousef) undertake surveillance of the presidential party, preparing for an assassination attempt on Clinton’s life. The 911 Commission says that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed sent $3,000 to Yousef to fund the plot.

According to Triple Cross (p. 163), Yousef and associate Wali Khan Amin Shah applied for visas on November 3 and travel to Manila (Khan would later be captured and tortured by Philippine police and then “rendered” to the United States). Triple Cross claims that Terry Nichols, accomplice in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, was also in the Philippines at the same time.

Clinton arrived in the country after a visit to Saudi Arabia, where he met with King Fahd at King Khalid Military City in Hafr-Al-Batin in the north, near the Iraqi border. “I had been impressed by Fahd’s call, in early 1993, asking me to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims,” Clinton later writes (My Life, p. 627).

It was hardly a humanitarian move on the Saudi part. Bosnia would be one of the first locations outside Afghanistan where radical Islamists and al Qaeda adherents would travel to and carry out jihad, and Osama bin Laden certainly saw the slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia as part of the global assault on the Islamic people.

Meanwhile in Afghanistan, the Taliban have their first significant military success, capturing Kandahar in the south. It all happened in November 1994, all the threads gathering, but the global pattern was unseen at the time.

11 November 1996

Posted on November 11, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

The FBI first interviews Jamal al-Fadl and is taken on quite a ride.

The Sudanese national Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl walked into the U.S. Embassy in Asmara, Eritrea in June 1996, claiming that he was a secretary and fixer for Osama bin Laden in Sudan. As the FBI would later tell the story to Lawrence Wright, al-Fadl embezzled $110,000 from al Qaeda; when bin Laden found out about it, and al-Fadl begged for forgiveness, bin Laden said the money would have to be returned. Fadl flees. He attempts to become an agent for Saudi Arabia and even Israel before he lands with the FBI. (Looming Tower, p. 197)

As the story goes, al-Fadl had lived in Brooklyn and was connected to the Al-Kifah Center, then the radical mosque linked to the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the “blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel Rahman.

After a long vetting process in Germany, al-Fadl began to tell the FBI of al Qaeda’s worldwide organization, activities, and finances. He is such a valuable source, he is moved to the U.S. under witness protection, and in New Jersey, “junior”—as the FBI handlers called him—spills on everything from plots known and unknown to al Qaeda’s supposed pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. That little tidbit rockets his information to the White House.

Though the WMD report would receive wide circulation—and would influence the U.S. cruise missile attack in Sudan two years later—according to Wright (who is always complimentary of the FBI), outside of a small circle of FBI specialists and prosecutors, Fadl’s reports engender little interest. (Looming Tower, p. 242)

George Tenet says in his autobiography (At the Center of the Storm, p. 102) that al-Fadl (whom he doesn’t name) “told us that UBL [bin Laden] was the head of a worldwide terrorist organization with a board of directors that would include the likes of Ayman al-Zawahiri and that he wanted to strike the United States on our soil. We learned that al Qaeda had attempted to acquire material that could be used to develop chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capability. He had gone so far as to hire an Egyptian physicist to work on nuclear and chemical projects in Sudan.”

Oh, and al-Fadl won the New Jersey Lottery. He is still thought to be in witness protection.

10 November 2000

Posted on November 10, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

CIA analysts brief the White House Small Group on their preliminary findings that the October attack on the USS Cole in Yemen was carried out by a cell of Yemeni residents with some ties to the transnational “mujahideen” network. According to the briefing, these local residents likely had some support from al Qaeda. The CIA concluded that it had little intelligence to prove outside sponsorship, support, and direction of the operation. (See 911 Commission, p. 194)

The report was later shared with the incoming Bush administration and it likely influenced their decision not to retaliate against al Qaeda, President Bush already expressing that he was done “swatting at flies.” But the conviction not to employ cruise missiles—and to approach terrorism in new ways, “anything but Clinton” (ABC) some described the new policy as being—also stalled any momentum towards understanding the al Qaeda threat. The CIA would scramble mightily to get White House attention with regard to al Qaeda, and though that inattention was later used to excuse the Agency and blame the White House for 9/11, it was, in fact, that November 10, 2000 report that is most instructive. The CIA just lacked hard intelligence—even if the Bush White House paid attention perhaps the plot would have never been uncovered.

9 November 2000

Posted on November 9, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

George W. Bush’s lead over Al Gore in all-or-nothing Florida presidential race slips beneath 300 votes in a suspense-filled recount. Vice President Gore telephones Bush to concede but then calls back about an hour later to retract his concession.

Bush’s camp presses Gore to concede without pursuing multiple recounts. The unofficial tally gives Bush a 327-vote lead. A statewide recount begins in Florida the next day. Over the next two weeks, some 19,000 votes were disqualified.

Gore then takes the presidential election to the courts, claiming “an injustice unparalleled in our history.” Bush’s team goes to court, seeking an order to block manual recounts. When Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris announces she would end the recounting at 5 p.m. on November 14, it prompts an immediate appeal by Gore lawyers.

8 November 1998

Posted on November 8, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

The United States posts a $5 million reward for information leading to the capture of Osama bin Laden in light of his indictment (see November 4).

Diplomatic inquiries are made of the Taliban government in Afghanistan to turn him over. They respond by offering to try bin Laden themselves. After a secret court hearing, and with no U.S. representative present, they find him “innocent” of wrongdoing.

Much has been written about the reasons for Taliban support of bin Laden—that he was bankrolling the regime, or that al Qaeda was helping to fight the normal tribes and alliances resisting Taliban rule and still holding parts of the country. But he didn’t have that much money left after leaving Sudan (and losing much) and al Qaeda wasn’t really engaged in combat. Instead it was a genuine ideological affinity, especially given international condemnation of the Taliban. And Saudi insistence. Perhaps. It was one of only three countries recognizing and supporting the Taliban.

7 November 2000

Posted on November 7, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Saudi Arabia opens a border-crossing point with Iraq to facilitate Saudi exports to Iraq under the U.N. “oil for food” program. The land border had been closed between the two countries since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Since at least 1998 (when U.N. inspectors were ejected from the country), sanctions against Iraq had been crumbling, prominent countries like France and Russia increasingly contracting with Baghdad, commercial air travel restored, and illicit trade increasing.

There’s no evidence now that much weapons-of-mass-destruction materials flowed into the country between 1998 and 9/11, but the general crumbling of sanctions worried Washington that indeed Saddam would escape from “the box” he’d been put in.

Colin Powell in particular as Secretary of State in the new administration would seek to reinvigorate sanctions with his proposed “smart sanctions” regime. But the program never got off the ground before 9/11 and then certain war with Iraq loomed.

6 November 2000

Posted on November 6, 2020November 6, 2020 by William Arkin

On Election Eve in the race between George W. Bush and Al Gore, Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi take their instrument rating airplane test at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida. Atta receives a score of 90 in 122 minutes and al-Shehhi receives a score of 75 in 89 minutes. Two weeks later, they each receive an FAA Temporary Airman Certificate, qualifying them as “private pilots.”

With their temporary licenses, the two were then able to sign out airplanes for solo flights. They did so on a number of occasions, often returning at 2:00 and 3:00 A.M., after logging four or five hours of flying time. They would also begin training simulations to fly larger commercial airliners, though neither would pilot or even co-pilot a commercial jet before September 11.